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In the Supreme Court of
the. State of Utah
P. K. EDMUNDS, ELLA M. EDMUNDS, CHARLO·TTE EDMUNDS,
a minor, FRANKLIN EDMUNDS, a
minor, JOHN EDMUNDS, a mino'r
and ANN EDMUNDS, a minor, by
their guardian ad litem,', ELLA M.
EDMUNDS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents
vs.
KENNETH GERMER, JED R. ABBOTT, and DAVID R. WALDRON,
partners, doing business under the firm
name of GERMER, ABBOTT & W ALDRON,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
9349

DEFENDANTS AN;D APPELLANTS BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from six judgments entered against
appellants in favor of the respondents on the 9th day of
March, 1960, in the District Court of Ir~n County, Utah,
for a total sum of $16,000.00, upon verdicts returned by
a jury. From this point on, appellants elect to refer to
respondents as they are designated below.
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The plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, recovered judgment
for $11,500.00. The plaintiff, Ella M. Edmunds, recovered
for $2500.00 and each of the other plaintiffs for $500.00
(R. 88-99). Suit was commenced on the 6th day of July,
1959. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case, defendants
moved for directed verdicts and also at the conclusion of the
evidence before submission of the case to the jury (Tr.
2 0 5-2 0 8, 3 13 ) . Both of these motions were taken under
advisement and subsequently were denied, along with
defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdicts and for a new trial (R. 107).
These judgments were for personal injuries sustained
in an automobile accident which occurred on November
27, 1955 on an abandoned section of U. S. Highway 91,
about 1 Yz miles North of the town of Paragonah, Utah
(Tr. 21-2).
The defendants were the successful bidders on a
contract with the Utah State Road Commission and were
constructing a section of new highway, U. S. 91, in Iron
County, which paralleled the old U. S. Highway 91 for
some 12 miles (Ex. 12, Tr. 243). This new highway was
completed and was in use by the travelling public several
weeks before the day of the accident. (Tr. 211-212, 220,
263).
The old section of highway had been cut in 20 places
to provide for irrigation and drainage and was fenced off
at various points throughout its length at six places, so
that it was no longer useable for travel (Tr. 288-9, 255,
257, 296-7).
In the course of the trial the question arose as to
whether all of these cuts in the old road had been made
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prior to the 19th of November, 1955 or if some may have
been made after the accident, in the following spring.
Defendants' testimony was that they were all made before
the 19th of November, 1955. If so, it would have been
impossible for plaintiff Edmunds to have driven his automobile as far on the old road as he claims he travelled before
encountering difficulty. Defendants regard this question
as of small ·Consequence in view of the uncontradicted fact
that Edmunds drove on this old road for some distance
before driving into one of these cuts. This latter point is
the only fact on this phase of the case of any importance.
The accident occurred on a Sunday afternoon between
3:30 and 4:00 p.m., when the plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds,
took his wife and four of his children and their guest for
an automobile ride. (Tr. 216). They left from their home
in Cedar City and drove North through Paragonah to
where this new section of highway had been constructed
and where Edmunds owned land on both sides of the highway. According to the plaintiffs' testimony, in proceeding
North from Paragonah the plaintiffs travelled on the new
section of highway from the point of confluence of the
old and new roads for a distance of about a mile (Tr. 96).
They travelled to about the North line of plaintiff Edmunds' land, where they turned East on an access road
leading from the new highway to the East right-of-way
line where Edmunds owned property. They then turned
around and drove West on an access road leading to property on the West side of the right-of-way, crossed the new
highway and drove only as far as the abandoned road, where
they turned South on this old road and drove to the point of
accident (Tr. 94-98, 186-7).
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As has been stated, plaintiff P. K. Edmunds owned land
West of U. S. Highway 91. He wanted to see this land as
well as his property East of the new highway and to show
it to his guest. However, it was not necessary for him to
use the old road in order to reach his property on the West.
He had been provided with an access road to it pursuant
to contract with the State Road Commission and could,
had he chosen, have travelled South on the new road to
his access road and this would have been as convenient for
his purposes as the old highway (Tr. 143-145, 158). Mter
seeing his property and perhaps even making a brief stop
on the old road, he continued to drive South on this old
road. After leaving his property, he could have returned
to the new road, which he knew to be a much better highway, from at least two places (Tr. 102, 152-3 ). He chose
not to do so and continued on until he ran into a drainage,
cut, located a few hundred feet North of the point where
the old road, if still in existence, would have joined the
highway again to the South (Tr. 104, 174, 192).
Plaintiff Ella Edmunds testified that she expected that·
her husband would use one of the access roads available to
return to the new highway (Tr. 192).
Edmunds saw this cut in the old road but mistook it
for an access road to his property until too late to stop
and avoid running into it (Tr. 98-9). He claims that
immediately before the accident he had been driving at
about 45 miles per hour (Tr. 112).
This old road at the point of the accident and for a
considerable distance in both directions was practically
straight. It was also level. The weather was good, the
surface of the old road was dry and it was broad daylight.
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Visibility was unlimited and, according to the testimony,
the driver was looking straight ahead (Tr. 43, 175, 186,
216, 295). Objects and road conditions could be observed
at a great distance (Tr. 187-8).
According to the investigating officer, the. cut was
plainly visible (Tr. 44). This officer found where the
driver had laid down 50 feet ofheayy skid marks leading
up to the edge_ of the cut (Tr.- 27).
The cut into whi.ch Edmunds plunged his car was 27
feet wide at the top and about 4Yi feet deep by actual
measurement (Tr. 262). ·
Other testimony concerning its width and depth,
including tha,t of plaintiff P. K. Edmunds, estimated the
cut varied from 20 feet wide to 10 to 12 feet wide and.
from 2Yi to 8 feet deep (Tr. 42, 101). The sides of the
cut were not abrupt, but were sloping. The car came to
rest with its rear end in the bottom and the front end on
the South bank of the cut (Tr. 24, 46, 47, 101, 214).
The defendant contractors were not working on the
project the day of the accident, but had been ordered to
discontinue work until spring due to adverse weather conditions. The shut-down began November 19, 1955 (Tr.
202-3, 225-229, 232, 233, Ex. 15, Ex. 17). The defendants had also removed all of their men and equipment from
the job site (Tr. 45, 148, 149, 258, 259, 292, 293). By
November 19, 1955, all of the work on the project covered
by the contract had been completed, with the exception
of the scarification of the surface of the old road in order
to encourage growth of vegetation (Tr. 246, 293).
The plaintiffs contend that they were given no warning of the cuts in the old road or that it had been with-
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drawn from use by the public and that the defendant
contractors had failed to post adequate warnings or barricades at the scene of the accident. The record in this
case fairly establishes the following facts:
The plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, owner of some of the
land through which the new section of highway was to
be constructed, had sold a portion of his land to the State
of Utah to provide a right-of-way on which the new highway could be built (Tr. 95, 96, 143, 144, 157). Hence
he knew of the plans of the state to construct a new road.
Also, during all of the months that construction was going
on, he was travelling this section of the highway frequently
in going to and from his farm and travelling North as far
as Salt Lake City (Tr. 142-3). Early in November, 1955,
he had made a visit to his farm. Although he had no recollection of driving on the new highway and was unable to
say when the new section had been opened for public
travel, he undoubtedly used the new road on this occasion
(Tr. 146-148). As we have already pointed out, this new
road had been in use and non-use of the old abandoned
road had been in effect from the end of September, 1955two months before the accident (Tr. 211, 213, 220, 263).
Edmunds was unable to definitely deny that he had travelled on the new road before the date of the accident. There
is no question about his knowledge that the new road was
in use on November 27, 1955, inasmuch as by his own
statement, he used it on that day in travelling to the North
line of his property (Tr. 184).
From the date when the new road was opened, there
is ample evidence that no traffic, except Edmunds' car,
made any attempt to use the old road after the new high-
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way was opened for travel (Tr. 44, 45, 152, 153, 156, 212,
234, 268). On the day when the accident occurred, he
was also aware that his was the only vehicle attempting to
use the old highway. He gave no thought whatever to this
significant fact as a warning of possible danger to himself
and his family (Tr. 75).
Furthermore, for weeks before the accident, the old
highway was completely torn up and obliterated and barricaded on the North end so that traffic could not even
drive to it from the North (Tr. 210, 212, 222, 223, 231).
On the South end a large sign and barricade, 16 feet long
and 4Yz feet high, was placed squarely across where the
old road had been. This sign and barricade was directly
in front of Edmunds as he drove North and turned slightly
to the East onto the new road. This sign was marked in
large luminous letters ((ROAD CLOSED" and ((DETOUR." There is no evidence that contradicts the defendants' evidence that this sign at the South end of the old
road was in place and in plain view on the date of the
accident (Ex. 18, Tr. 38, 39, 41, 42,224,231-233,242,
264-266). The only thing Edmunds says about this barricade is that he did not see it on the day of the accident
as he drove North, but he refused to deny that it was there
(Tr. 41-42, 113, 150-151). In addition, over 200 feet of
the old road, where it had been joined to the highway on
the South, had been entirely removed and obliterated in
October of 1955 and could not possibly have been used for
travel. This was evident to anyone taking the trouble to
even look. It would have been impossible for Edmunds to
drive onto the old road from the South because of this
condition (Tr. 24-25, 224-25, 233-35, 267-68). The cut
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into which Edmunds drove his car was made by the defendants under the direction and supervision of the resident
engineer, who designated to the contractors the points at
which all of the cuts were to be made. Their purpose was
to provide drainage away from the new roadway and in
some instances for irrigation purposes. (Tr. 226-233, 240,
241, 244, 257). All of the cuts were readily discernible
to anyone travelling on the new road, which was only about
100 feet East of the old roadway (Tr. 22, 187, 188, 212).
In addition, at six points on the right-of-way, fences had
been constructed across this old road and three of these
fences crossed the old highway South of Lunt Park, located
about 5 miles North of the South end of the project (Tr.
222, 223, 266, 267, 269, 284). In addition, there were
roadblocking barricades and signs located at four different
points at public cross-roads on the old right-of-way to
warn the public not to travel on the old highway (Tr. 289).
As has been above stated, all operations of the defendants had been suspended by order of the State Road Commission, on November 19, 1955; prior to this date the
resident engineer made an inspection of the project and
ordered the defendants to take certain action in preparation
to suspend operations (Ex. 17, Tr. 227-28). Afterwards,
he made another inspection and satisfied himself that all
of his requirements had been met and thereupon issued the
suspension order (Ex. 15, Tr. 225, 248-49). Inspection by
him included a determination that defendants had constructed the necessary fences and had installed or repaired
and placed all signs required to insure the safety of the
public (Tr. 225, 227, 243). Under these conditions the
work was suspended on November 19, 1955 and the de-
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fendants left the project for the winter, and the State Road
Commission took over and assumed control until the following spring (Tr. 207). No suspension order would have
been issued unless the defendants had fully complied with
all of the requirements of the resident engineer (Tr. 249).
After the suspension order became effective the defendants
were not allowed to do any further work until ordered
by the engineer (Tr. 272). The scarification of the surface
of the old road was not a part of the work required before
suspension of work. (Ex. 17, Tr. 203).
On the question of the erection of signs or barricades
at drainage cuts, or on approach roads crossing the old
highway, the resident engineer testified that contractors
were never required to construct them (Tr. 249-50).
The plaintiffs, P. K. Edmunds and Ella Edmunds, seek
to excuse the conduct of P. K. Edmunds by claiming that
the appearance of the old roadway was deceptive in that
the cut where the accident happened was mistaken by him
for an access road covered with blacktop which would lead
to the new highway. He admits that he saw it, but mistook
it for an access road. The facts, however, are that there
was no blacktopping at all near this cut, nor was any access
road located near this point (Tr. 299). Edmunds admitted
that he did not know if blacktopping on the access roads
extended all the way to the property lines (Tr. 160).
The evidence is uncontradicated that at least half of
the access roads provided by the state in this area were only
blacktopped for a distance of 20 to 25 feet from the new
highway and the rest of the way to the property line on
these access roads the surface was the natural soil of the
area (Tr. 230-231, 298-299).
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That these plaintiffs were guilty of inattention is
attested by the fact that they were engaged in pointing
out the countryside to their guest, an activity in which
P. K. Edmunds admitted that he participated (Tr. 151).

It is essential to make some reference to the injuries
of the various plaintiffs. The four children involved received only negligible bruises and perhaps one of them
had a small cut or two. They were superficially examined
by their father, P. K. Edmunds, who is a physician, at the
accident scene. They were never hospitalized and their
injuries required no treatment whatsoever. No medical or
other expense of any kind was ever incurred in treating
them or any of the plaintiffs (Tr. 178, 182, 183, 189).
The plaintiff, Ella Edmunds, received a bump on the
back of the head and on the lower back and a twisted ankle
(Tr. 177). She reluctantly went for an X-ray examination
the day following the accident (Tr. 180). She had no
further examination and no treatment. She treated herself
with a few aspirin and some sedatives (Tr. 180, 190, 191).
There were no fractures involved and her injuries had all
disappeared in three to four weeks (Tr. 180-182). Following the accident, she carried on her usual household
duties, caring for her husband and eight children (Tr.
181). She herself described her injuries as not serious and
herself as fully recovered in a few weeks (Tr. 188, 189,
190, 191). Both Mrs. Edmunds and the children were
taken home from the accident scene by a passer-by in a
car (Tr. 101-102). They got into and out of his car without any assistance and presented no appearance of any
injury (Tr. 215-216). They made no complaints of injury
to him during the ride home (Tr. 217).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENTS:
(a) BECAUSE DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY

OF NO ACT OF NEGLIGENCE CAUSING
INJURY TO· PLAINTIFFS.
(b) BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE, AS A MATTER
OF LAW, CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT
THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF, P. K.
EDMUNDS, WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT IN FAVO·R OF
PLAINTIFF, P. K. EDMUNDS, FOR THE REASON
THAT SAID PLAINTIFF WAS GUlL TY O·F NEGLIGENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
NEW TRIAL AS TO PLAINTIFFS ELLA M. EDMUNDS, CHARLOTTE EDMUNDS, FRANKLIN
EDMUNDS, JOHN EDMUNDS and ANN EDMUNDS,
FOR THE REASON THAT THE DAMAGES
AWARDED TO· SAID PLAINTIFFS ARE EXCESSIVE,
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT CO·MMITTED ERROR IN
ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 2, 9, 12 AND 17.
PO,INT V.
THE TRIAL COURT CO·MMITTED ERROR IN
ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENTS:
(a) BECAUSE DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY

OF NO· ACT OF NEGLIGENCE CAUSING
INJURY TO PLAINTIFFS.
(b) BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE, AS A MATTER
OF LAW, CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT
THE NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF, P. K.
EDMUNDS, WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES.
The first proposition relied upon by defendants is that
they were guilty of no negligent act causing injury to
plaintiffs.
The alleged negligence relied upon by plaintiffs is that
defendants wrongfully and negligently caused and permitted a hole or excavation to exist in a public road, without placing any barricades or signs at the point where the
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hole and excavation was made to warn and prevent persons
from using said road. It is conceded by defendants that at
the place of accident no barricade or sign was erected by
them. It is not conceded, however, that the place of accident was in any sense of the term a public road. The
record is ·Without dispute that the place of accident had
been withdrawn from use as a highway by the State of
Utah several weeks before the date of the accident. The
accident occurred on the 27th of November, 1955. The
new road constructed by the defendants was taken over
and placed in use by the state in the last week of September,
1955.
Proof that the old section of highway had been 'withdrawn is the undisputed fact that barricades and signs had
been placed and erected in at least four places on the old
highway. This was done at the North and South ends of
the abandoned road and at two other locations in between,
where the old highway was crossed by other public roads
(Tr. 264, 266, 288). Signs at each of these points warned
the public that the old road was closed. Furthermore, there
were right-of-way fences which crossed the old highway at
six different points and which also constituted a barrier
and a warning that the old road was no longer to be travelled (Tr. 284). Three of these fences were South of Lunt
Park (Tr. 222-223). As further warning to the public
that the old highway was abandoned and withdrawn from
use, both the South and the North ends thereof had been
completely obliterated and removed, so that on the day
of the accident it was perfectly evident that the old road
no longer constituted a highway. This obliteration on the
North end, was for a distance of a hundred feet and, at
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the South end, for a distance of two hundred to two hundred and fifty feet (Tr. 224-225, 267-68). Even this
was not all. The old road had been cut through in twenty
pla.ces by cuts which vary from twenty to thirty feet wide,
further indicating that it was no longer a highway. These
cuts could readily be seen from the new highway which
was only about a hundred feet to the East from where the
old highway had been. Three to five of these cuts were
located between the North line of the Edmunds property
and the point of accident, a distance of about a mile and
a half (Tr. 301).
All of the cuts through the old highway, according
to the testimony of defendants and the State Highway
Engineer were made before the 19th of November, 1955
(Tr. 244-257). Finally, the new section of highway was
open and in use for at least seven weeks before the date of
accident.
The effectiveness of the measures taken by the defendants and the State of Utah to give notice to the public
that the old road was no longer to be used is eloquently
attested by the undisputed fact that all traffic on the highway used the new section of road from the time it was
opened in the last week of September until the date of
accident. Testimony in the record is that not one automobile was ever seen attempting to use the old road from
the time the new road was opened. Plaintiff Edmunds was
the only member of the public known to attempt such
use (Tr. 44-45, 212). On the day when he .made use of
the old road to his misfortune, he noted that no one else
was following his example (Tr. 156 ) and furthermore,
on the day of the accident, in travelling to the North line
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of his property, he himself used the new road (Tr. 96).
As has been noted, plaintiffs complain because no barricade or sign was erected at the point where they ran into
a drainage cut in the old road. We point out that if it was
the duty of defendants to erect a sign and barricade at this
point, they should have likewise done the same thing at
every other point where the old road had been cut for drainage or to provide an irrigation channel. Since there were
twenty of these cuts, this would have required the erection
of forty signs and barricades on this old road. No provision
of the contract required such action by the defendants and
the engineer in charge of the project testified that highway
contractors were never required to take such precautions
(Tr. 249-250). We know of no case imposing such a burdensome duty upon a state or highway contractor.
Plaintiffs also complain that because there was no
sign posted at the point where they drove from a private
access road onto the old highway, warning them the old
road was unsafe, defendants were negligent. The private
roadways or access roads on this highway were located
every 2100 feet along the new highway (Tr. 286).
No case we know of imposes a burden upon a state
or highway contractor to place signs or barricades on an
abandoned highway at every point where it is crossed
by a private driveway or access road. To impose such a
burden would be unreasonable and intolerable. So far as
we are aware the requirements of reasonable safety are
met if such a road is barricaded and signed at its ends and
where it is intersected by public roads. The evidence is
uncontradicted that at every such point the old highway
had been barricaded and signed giving such warning.
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In the contract between the state and the defendant
contractors there is a provision which is part of the
Standard Specifications requirin~ contractors to provide
and maintain necessary signs and barricades for the safety
of the public (Ex. 12, Standard Specifications 1-7.10, page
39) . This specifi.ca tion, however, does not define nor particularize any standard of compliance and, we submit,
will not support the contention of the plaintiffs that signs
and barricades should have been erected at all the points
where they contend they should have been placed.
On November 19, 1955, the work of the defendants
was suspended due to weather and seasonal conditions,
which made such suspension necessary. Work ceased upon
an order issued by the resident engineer (Tr. 202-3, 225,
Ex. 15) . From this date no further work was done by
the defendants or permitted by the state until June 28,
1956 (Ex. 16). Before work ceased on November 19,
1955, the engineer in charge for the state made an inspection of the project · to determine what had to be done
before the work could be closed down. He made certain
requirements by written instructions (Tr. 227, Ex. 17).
He came back to the project afterwards and before issuing
his suspension order made a determination that all of his
requirements, including safety precautions, had been carried out (Ex. 15, Tr. 225-227). It is to be observed that
he especially satisfied himself as to the erection of signs
and barricades and the work was not allowed to cease until
he was fully satisfied.
It is earnestly submitted that the best criterion of
reasonable care on the part of defendants in regard to the
placing of barriers and signs lies in the action of the com-
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petent state officials charged with the duty of supervising
the construction of public highways and possessing knowledge and experience qualifying then: to be the best judges
of what would constitute adequate safety measures on a
road project.
No attempt was ever made by plaintiffs to show that
the precautions. carried out by the defendants under the
orders of the State of Utah were not adequate, nor was
any testimony introduced by which it appeared by competent opinion that the defendants had failed in any respect. The case was simply permitted to go to the jury,
composed of unskilled laymen, to determine whether the
defendants were negligent because they did not erect signs
or barricades at every private crossing or cut made through
the old abandoned highway, and only erected such signs
and barricades as the state required. No instruction was
given to the jury as a guide, other than a general instruction that the jury could find in favor of the plaintiffs if
they found negligence on the part of the defendants in
leaving a trench or excavation in a roadway unguarded
by a barricade or sign to warn travelers of the danger
(Instruction No.9, R. 75). Another instruction was given,
which defendants assert was palpably error, which
stated that it was the duty of the defendants to use reasonable care to exclude public travel from that portion of
the roadway made impassable and dangerous by the drainage ditch and to erect barricades and warning signs and
that failure to do so would constitute negligence (Instruction No. 12, R. 78). We shall have more to say
hereafter concerning these instructions.
The evidence is manifestly clear that the old section
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of road was no longer a public highway on the day of the
accident. The case went to the jury on the undisputed
testimony that defendants,.cut a drainage ditch in the old
highway pursuant to the requirements of their contract
and plaintiffs ran into this ditch in broad daylight, which
they admit they saw, but which they claim they mistook
for a private crossing from the new highway to private
property West of the right-of-way. We contend that
this evidence is insufficient to support any finding of
negligence chargeable to defendants.
One of the provisions of the Standard Specifications
gave the State Road Highway Engineer in charge sole
discretion to make all decisions as to the work to be performed and as to the manner of performance (Ex. 12,
Standard Specifications 1-5.1, page 23). We submit that
this right of decision vested in the engineer should be
binding upon the plaintiffs until a showing is made that
he failed to perform his duty and that it was error under
these circumstances to permit the jury to make a finding
of negligence. Had the defendants gone ahead and erected
barricades and signs at the places where plaintiffs, by
hindsight, now claim they should have been placed, they
would have been obliged to do so at their own cost and
expense, since no provision of the contract or order of
the engineer in charge required this to be done, nor made
any provision for payment if it was done.
Another point illustrating the injustice of the judgments against the defendants is that they were held liable
for the condition of an abandoned road over which they
had no control when the accident occurred. From the
19th of Noven'lber, 1955, when the above described sus-
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pension order went into effect, the defendants were no
longer on this project doing any work nor were they
charged with any responsibility of any kind during this
period of time. This was the period during which the
State of Utah assumed sole responsibility for the project.
Section 1-4.5 of the Standard Specifications, pages 21 and
22, provided ((When construction operations are suspended by written order of the engineer for seasonal
conditions ~~- ~:- * for which the contractor is not responsible, maintenance of the road under traffic including
signs and barricades, etc., shall be performed by and at
the expense of the Commission during the period of
suspension. * :~o ::- necessary signs and barricades as provided by the contractor shall be left in place during the
time of suspension." (Ex. 12, Standard Specifications).
It is submitted that, under this provision of the
contract, on the date of the accident, the state, under its
suspension order (Ex. 15) having assumed control of the
project, it was the duty of the Road Commission to
provide and maintain any necessary safety devices and
precautions on this highway or its adjacent appurtenances
and that the defendants were consequently relieved of such
responsibility and of all liability in connection therewith.
If the defendants had failed in any regard to perform
some portion of the contract with respect to safety, then
the state should have done the necessary work at the contractors' expense. This same provision of the Standard
Specifications further provided: cc::. ::- ::-,the engineer shall
perform at the contractors' expense, such work which,
in the engineer's opinion, is necessary to provide a satisfactory condition for traffic. ::- ::- ::- "
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We anticipate that plaintiffs will argue that th~ responsibility of the contractors continued until final acceptance and since this 'project had not been finally
accepted, the responsibility of defendants' was a continuing
one under the provisions of the, contract. The following
cases and authorities hold that in instances where a new
highway lias beeri taken over by a public body which assumes control of it and places traffic thereon, that at that
time .accepta'nce for all practical purposes is complete
and such acceptance relieves the contractor of any liability
for accidents occurtlng after the date of such practical
acceptance:

Donaldson vs. Jones, Washingt$n, 61 Pac. 2, 1007
Memphis Asphalt Co. v. Fleming, Ark. 132 SW 222
13 ALR 2, 191, pages 211, 219
58 ALR 2, 865, pages 876, 878

In this case, the new section of highway had been
accepted by the state and had been put in public use and
this occurred in the last week of September, 1955, at which
time the new highway was fully completed (Tr. 220-221).
After November 19, 1955, all that remained for the contractor to perform was to return when weather conditions permitted to break up the surface of the old road
to encourage the growth of vegetation thereon (Tr. 293294).
Since defendants were guilty of no negligence causing
injury to plaintiffs and since they owed no duty to plaintiffs on the day of the accident, it naturally follows that
the sole proximate cause of injury was the negligence of
plaintiff P. K. Edmunds, driver of the vehicle which
plunged into the drainage cut. It is defendant's conten-
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tion that his negligence was the sole cause of injury
and that consequently none of the plaintiffs should be
entitled to recover.
In Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, 85 Utah 79, 38
P 2, 743, it was contended that a road contractor had
failed to erect and maintain a suitable barricade across
a new highway under construction and to properly light
it. In that case, as here, an automobile was driven into
an excavation. This court held that the barricade was
sufficient to discharge the contractor's duty and further
that the guest plaintiff could not recover from the contractor because his injuries were caused by the negligence
of the driver alone. See O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368,
213 P. 791. We submit that th~se cases support our
contention on the question of proximate cause.
That plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, was negligent, is incontrovertibly demonstrated in the record. First of all,
he departed from a safe and designated highway free of
obstruction and hazard to travel at his own risk upon an
abandoned road which he knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered, was no longer open
for public travel. He was aware that the new section of
highway was in use, having used it himself, and saw all
of the travelling public using it ·exclusively.

It had been held by this court that where a street
is laid out and is plainly designated for travel and is
adequate, there is no duty to keep the undesignated portion
of the right-of-way free from danger. A traveller departing from the designated way intentionally does so at his
own peril. There are no implied assurances that the undesignated portions are free from obstructions or danger.
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This court said, in Jensen v. Logan City·, 89 Utah
H:'.::- ::- where one ceases by
deliberation or intention to use the designated portion he
can no longer be reasonably using it and he goes thereafter
on his own responsibility." See also Herndon v. Salt Lake
City, 34 Utah 65, p. 81; 95 Pac. 646.
347, page 372, 57 P2 708

It is argued by plaintiffs that the old highway had
the appearance of a road open and fit for travel and
hence the plaintiffs had an implied right to use it. The
fallacy in this argument lies in the fact that plaintiff
P. K. Edmunds ignored all of the obvious signs and warnings, which we have heretofore mentioned, that this old
highway was no longer a public road. He ignored the
sign stating that the road was closed. This was not a little
sign, difficult to see, it was 16 ft. long and 4Yz ft. high
and made of heavy timbers (Ex. 18, Tr. 264-65). It covered most of the entire width of what had been the old
highway and was placed squarely across the center of it
(Tr. 38-39, 41). P. K. Edmunds ignored completely the
fact that all the travelling public but himself was using
the new highway. He disregarded the plain indication
given by the fact that the entire South end of the old
road had been destroyed for 250 feet where it had forn1erly been part of the highway. Finally, if he had been
alert and observant as he should have been, he would
have seen that the old road was cut in many places.
This was plainly visible from the new highway only 100
feet away. This is not a case where no indications existed
which a traveller could reasonably be expected to see,
giving him warning of danger.
The final answer to plaintiffs' claim that they were
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justified in using the old road lies in the fact that in
broad daylight, on a level, straight surface, with no obstruction to vision and unlimited visibility, Edmunds ran
his car into a trench 27 feet wide and 4Yz feet deep. No
extenuating circumstance excused such conduct. He testified that he was looking straight ahead at the time,
driving 45 miles per hour. Seated in the driver's seat
and looking ahead and down at the surface over which
he travelled, he could have seen the break in the surface
for hundreds of feet, had he looked or paid attention.
A plane drawn from the edge of the cut in a straight line
to eye level of a driver seated in a car would have revealed
the far bank of the cut long before it was reached. This
is an inescapable physical fact. Eye level would have been
at least 4Yz feet above the surface of the old road.
Furthermore, P. K. Edmunds was not a stranger to
the area. He had observed a new highway under construction in the area for months and had provided part
of the right of way on which it was built. When the
new road was opened, which he knew had occurred, he
was bound to know that the old road was no longer
intended for travel. We do not have a case here of a
road being taken out of use without any warning to the
public and without any other means of travel provided
obvious to all travellers. Here we are confronted with
the case of a new highway paralleling an old one at a
distance of a hundred feet and which was in plain view,
plainly and obviously indicated as the highway which
should be used and which every other traveller was using.
All the cases imposing liability for failure to warn of an
abandoned highway are cases in which the public had
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been given no reasonable notice that abandonment had
taken place.
Here we merely have a case involving a driver who
was inattentive, engaged in showing a guest ·the features
of the surrounding country and his own property and
not maintaining proper lookout. (T r. 151 ) .
To relieve the plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, of the stigma
of negligence an attempt was ·made to show that he
was deceived into thinking that the cut through the old
highway, which, by his own admission, he saw, was an
access road or private crossing, providing access to private
lands from the new highway. He described it as appearing
to him to be a blacktop surface. The facts are that there
was no blacktop in the area of the cut and hence the
cut would have had the color of the natural soil of the
area. There is no evidence in the record that the natural
color of the soil was black.
Hereafter we will cite many decisions which this
and other courts have decided imposing the duty upon
travellers and drivers to look where they are going and
charging them with the duty to see what is plain to be
seen. A party will not be heard to say that he could not
or did not see what reasonable diligence would disclose.
The cut into which P. K. Edmunds drove his automobile
was not narrow or small or concealed, nor was it just a
cut capriciously .n1ade by the defendants which they dug
and went away and forgot about. It was a part of the
structure of the new highway and was vital to its life
and maintenance and was a permanent part of the highway project itself.
A Utah decision exemplifying the duty of a driver
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to look is found in Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390,
216 P. 2 640. tc* ~~-- * a duty to look carries with it the
duty to see what is there to be seen."
We submit that none of the plaintiffs should recover
in this case for an accident which was caused solely by the
negligent act of a driver who could have seen, if he had
looked with purpose.
POINT II.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF, P. K. EDMUNDS, FOR THE REASON
THAT SAID PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW.
All that has been said regarding the conduct of plaintiff, P. K. EDMUNDS, as negligent and as the sole cause of
the injuries suffered by all the plaintiffs, applies with special
emphasis to him.
Without repetition of argument already made, defendants will limit their argument on this aspect of the
case to references to the cases where claimants have been
denied recovery because of their own fault.
To begin with, it is an elementary proposition that
every person is under a duty to use reasonable care for his
own safety, which includes, of course, a duty to keep a
reasonable lookout under all conditions where danger would
be reasonably anticipated. The following cases are among
those in which this court has spoken so often on this
subject:
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Scoffield v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 1 Utah 2, 218, 265,
P2, 396.

Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 229 P2, 874.
There are many Utah decisions involving automobile
accidents where plaintiffs have been denied recovery because of their failure to look and to maintain a lookout
for danger which they saw or should have seen. The
following are representative:
Spackn~an

v. Carson, supra.
Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P2, 495
Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P2, 437
Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2, 378, 294 P2, 788.
There are of course many cases dealing with automobile accidents where drivers have driven into excavations
and holes in public highways.
In Utah, Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, supra, is
typical. That case differs somewhat in its facts from this
case because the plaintiff in that case was a guest and also
in the fact that the accident happened at night on a highway which was in use, but through which a cut had been
made for a culvert. The driver in that case ran into a
barricade with a red lantern on each end. The lanterns
were visible for 600 feet, but the barricade was not seen
by the driver until he was just a few feet away from it. In
that case this court discussed the negligence of the driver
for paying no heed to the lanterns and driving into a cloud
of dust which obscured his vision and concluded that such
conduct was negligent as a matter of law and the sole
cause of the accident. We think that case is pertinent in
principle to this case, imposing a duty upon a driver to
keep a proper lookout and to pay attention to his surround-
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ings and what is visible in his path ahead. In this case it
should be observed that Edmunds does not deny that he
saw the cut in the highway; he did see it, but wants to
excuse himself on the ground that he mistook it for something else. Having seen something in the highway ahead
of him, he should have slowed down until he could determine what it was in fact.
In Christensen v. Grays Harbor County, Wash., 210
P2 69 3, a jury verdict in defendant's favor was affirmed
in a case where a driver drove into a chuckhole. That court
concluded that a driver is under a duty to avoid difficulties
and obstructions which could be seen by exercise of reasonable care.
In Denny v. Garavaglia, Mich. 52 NW2, 521, a driver
was denied recovery for injuries. sustained when at night
he drove into a hole extending half way across a highway
only 18 inches deep and filled with water. The court in
that case pointed out that there was a warning sign several
hundred feet from the point of accident cautioning drivers
to go slow and indicating road repairs were in progress.
The court held a reasonably careful person would have
given heed to the sign. That case was much stronger in
favor of the plaintiff than this one and yet in that case
recovery was denied. All of the many indications open and
apparent to Edmunds if he had looked and paid attention
made his conduct inexcusable. In this case there was a
sign, among other things, in plain view of P. K. Edmunds,
warning him that the old road was closed. His failure to
see or heed it was inexcusable.
See also Marshall v. City of Baton Rouge, La. 32 So. 2,
469
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Ritter v. Olson, Pa. 68 Atl. 2, 732
Price v. City of Monroe, N.C. 68 SE2, 283
Arceneaux v. Louisiana Highway Commission, La. 15
So.2, 638

The last before mentioned case was one where plaintiff's
chauffeur ran into a hole in a public highway. That
court held that the plaintiff could not recover for his inJUries. The following is part of the opinion of the court:
((* * * There should be no recovery because the
hole was open and apparent and could easily have
been seen and should have been seen by. plaintiff's
driver and therefore, if plaintiff's driver drove the
said automobile into the hole, the accident resulted
from his contributory negligence."

The court said further:
((The record creates in our mind a conviction that
the hole was (unseeable' to Smith only because he
did not see it because he was paying no attention
whatever to the road ahead :_'!. * * ."

Rohman v. Richmond Heights, Mo. 135 SW2, 378,
is a case very similar to this case and well illustrates why
the plaintiff, P. K.. Edmunds, should not recover at all.
The court, in deciding that case, made the following
observations:
tc::- ::- :_'!. Where the driver has knowledge that the
street is in a difficult condition or that construction
or repair work is in progress on the street, he may
not assume that the street is reasonably safe for
travel. Nor does the rule excuse the traveller in any
case from the exercise of his faculties to discover
and avoid obvious dangers. No one may be excused
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from seeing that which is in plain view and which
he could readily see by the exercise of due care

* * *"
H:l- * :t- he is not only required to look but to look
in such an observant manner as to enable him to
see the conditions which a person in the exercise
of due care and caution for his own safety and the
safety of others would have seen under like or similar circumstances and it is as much negligence to
fail to see that which can be observed by due care
as it is negligence not to look at all. * ::- ::- not to
see what is plainly visible when there is a duty to
look constitutes negligence."
That Court said further:
::- :t- ::- ((This ·Condition of the backfill was in plain
view. It was broad daylight at the time of the accident. ::- * : - nevertheless, plaintiff in broad daylight drove his car heedlessly onto this rough and
dangerous fill at such a high rate of speed that when
it hit one of the holes in the fill it jumped up in the
. "
a1r.

((To allow plaintiff to recover under the facts
as shown by his own evidence would be to reward
him for his own reckless conduct that endangered
not only his own life but the lives of others rightfully using the street."
Finally, the Court says:

* but saying he (plaintiff) could not see
what was in plain view in broad daylight is without
probitive force."
tt

::-

::-

Plaintiff in that case was denied recovery because of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.
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See also:
Miller v. Baltimore, Md., 157 Atl. 289
Taeckerv. Pickus, So. Dakota 235 NW 504
Abraham v. Sioux City, Iowa 250 NW 461
Schawe v. Leyendecker, Texas 269, SW 864
Presley v. C. M. Allen c5 Co. Inc., N. C. 66 SE2, 789

It is to be observed that in all of the cases quoted above,
the accidents occurred on highways which were actually
in use and not on highways which had been abandoned and
withdrawn from use. That being so, even assuming, in this
case, that the old roadway was in fact still a highway or
that it presented the appearance of a highway, which the
plaintiffs were invited to use, the plaintiff P. K. Edmunds
should not be permitted any recovery because he should
have seen the drainage cut in ample time to have stopped
before running into it. That being so, we submit the
judgment in his favor must be reversed.
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
NEW TRIAL AS TO PLAINTIFFS ELLA M. EDMUNDS, CHARLOTTE EDMUNDS, FRANKLIN
EDMUNDS, JOHN EDMUNDS AND ANN EDMUNDS FOR THE REASON THAT THE DAMAGES
AWARDED TO, SAID PLAINTIFFS ARE EXCESSIVE,
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The recital in the record of the injuries to the four
minors, CHARLOTTE, FRANKLIN, JOHN AND
ANN EDMUNDS shows beyond question that they received no injury in the accident worthy of mention. They
had a few bruises and one of them, just which one, is not
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clear, had a small cut. They received no treatment of any
kind. (Tr. 178, 183, 189).
In spite of the lack of any evidence of material injuries the jury awarded these children each $500.00 damages.
It is submitted that these awards were grossly excessive and
manifested a disposition on the part of the jury to give away
the defendant's money, not to award a sum commensurate
with injury actually sustained.
The trial court refused to rectify the jury's error or
to modify the verdict or to grant a new trial. It is submitted that this action entitled defendants to a new trial.
Although a judgment for $500.00 may appear to be small,
as judgments go in personal injury cases in these days,
when the evidence shows that an award given by a jury
is ten times as much as it should have been, the injustice
should not be allowed to go unnoticed or uncorrected.
The judgment in favor of plaintiff Ella M. Edmunds
had more basis in reality than the cases of the children, but
nonetheless, it too, was grossly excessive. Mrs. Edmunds
was X-rayed to determine the extent of her injuries, but
she never was treated (Tr. 180). There were no fractures
and all evidence of injury had disappeared in three to four
weeks. In the mean time, she carried on all her household
duties without interruption (Tr. 180-182). She characterized her injuries as slight or not serious with uneventful
and full recovery ( T r. 18 8-191) . In less than a week after
the accident Mrs. Edmunds acted as her husband's chauffeur, driving him to Las Vegas and then returned home
by bus (Tr. 105, 106). Three weeks later she went to
California and drove her husband back home (Tr. 106111). There was no justification for awarding this plain-
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tiff $2500.00. It is submitted that as a matter of law the
defendants are entitled fo a new trial to correct the intemperate action of the jury.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
ITS INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 2, 9, 12 AND 17.
Defendants complain of . error • commit~ed by the
court in instructing the jl,J.ry. The first of these errors
occurred in Instruction N 6. 2. In paragraph two of this
·instruction the following language appears:
((The plaintiffs claim that the defendants were
guilty of negligence in failing to place barriers,
obstacles or other devices to warn travellers of an
excavation across the roadway."

It is submitted that the reference to an excavation· across
((the roadway" was misleading and erroneous. All the
evidence shows conclusively that at the place where this
cut was made there was in fact no roadway, either authorized or in use. The old roadway had ceased to be a roadway
long before the accident. The fencing of it, the twenty
cuts across its length, the obliteration of the ends of the
old highway on the North and South, all precluded it from
being described as a highway.
The vice in this instruction is that it permitted the
jury to speculate that the defendants may have been using
the old road on the day of the accident as a matter of right
and that hence the defendants were under a duty to place
warning signs and barricades at the point where the excavation was made. At least the jury should have been
instructed that before they could find negligence, they
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should first find that the old highway was still in use or that
there were no indications that it was not to be used.
Again, in Instruction No. 9, the Court referred to
the excavation as having been made in a ((roadway." There
can be no question but what the state was at liberty to.close,
cut through or do anything else to the old roadway necessary to preserve and maintain the new road. For this reason the term ((roadway" applied to the place of accident
was inapplicable and was misleading to the jury.
Defendants particularly complain of Instruction No.
12; this instruction was little, if any, removed from the
scope of a directed verdict for the plaintiffs. It was erroneous for the reason that it permitted the jury to consider
the old roadway as part of the highway in the face of the
uncontradicted evidence that it was not a part of the highway intended for travel from the time the new section of
highway was opened for public use. After the opening of
the new highway, the defendants, under the direction of
the state, barricaded the old highway at both ends and at
other points where it intersected public cross-roads. (Tr.
289). Signs were posted advising travellers that the old
road was closed. It was then fenced off at at least six different places and twenty drainage and irrigation cuts were
made through it. After all this had been done this old roadway by no stretch of the imagination could be considered
a ttroadway" in the sense that it was intended for travel.
This instruction was further erroneous because it
stated that defendants were in some way bound to exclude
travellers without any limitation as to the steps required
to accomplish such exclusion. Just how the plaintiffs or
anyone else could have been so completely excluded from

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

the old road as to absolutely prevent its use does not appear
in this record. We think that the instruction was too broad
and was misleading to the jury. Furthermore, after November 19, 1955, when the state assumed full control of
the whole project, including the old roadway, the defendants were under no duty or obligation during this period of
suspension of work to exclude anybody from using the old
highway. They were fully relieved of all duty toward the
plaintiffs on the day of the accident. Any duty in this
respect at that time rested upon the State of Utah. Finally,
the opening of the new road and its acceptance relieved the
defendants from any liability for accident occurring on
any part of the project from that time on. ( 13 A.L.R.2,
191; 58 A.L.R.2, 865, supra and cases therein cited.)
The last paragraph of Instruction No. 17 invited the
jury to award damages to all the plaintiffs for future disability. Defendants excepted to this charge because the
record shows without any dispute that none of the plaintiffs except P. K. Edmunds made any claim of future
disability or permanent injury. The four children recovered ·Completely from their superficial injuries and plaintiff Ella M. Edmunds was fully recovered in three to four
weeksfollowingtheaccident (Tr.178, 181-183, 188-191).
To permit the jury to speculate concerning future disability and injury to these plaintiffs was manifestly erroneous
and an error entitling the defendants to a new trial. The
size of the verdicts in favor of these plaintiffs was so disproportionate as to leave the impression that the jury was
misled by the trial court's error.
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POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANTS.
Of the twenty-two numbered instructions requested
by defendants, the trial court gave but one as requested and
the substance of one other. These requests set out the defendants' theory of the case and defendants were entitled
to have them given.

Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines, 75 Utah 87, 283
Pac. 160
Defendants do not desire to argue extensively the
action of the trial court in denying their requests, but
attention should be directed to some of them.
By its refusal to give Instruction No. 7, the court denied the right of the defendants to have the jury instructed
upon the duty of plaintiff Ella M. Edmunds to keep a lookout. That she was under such a legal duty is clear. Her
duty to look was not as imperative as the duty of the driver,
but none the less she was under a duty to pay attention to
obvious danger seen by her and warn the driver. (Nielsen
v. Christensen-Gardner, supra). In refusing to give this
request and failing to give an adequate instruction on the
subject, the jury was entitled to assume that Mrs. Edmunds
was under no duty whatsoever to see dangers plainly apparent to her and give some warning thereof. Ella M. Edmunds
admits that she saw the cut in the road, as did her husband.
She affirmed the clearness of the day, the unlimited visibility and that objects could be seen at great distance (Tr.
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18 6-18 8). The undisputed fact that she saw the cut entitled defendants to the requested instruction.
Requested Instructions Nos. 15, 19, ·2 0 and 21 were
in conformity with defendahts' theory of the· case and were
supported by the evidence. Defendants' theory, as reflected
by said requested instructions, has been extensively argued
in the main portion ofthis brief and need not be repeated.
If the case should be ·remanded for a new trial, this court
should instruct the ·trial court that these requests should
be given; We earnestly contend that a jury could find from
the evidence that plaintiff P. K. Edmunds was on sufficient
notice that the old road had been closed to require him,
in the exercise of reasonable ·Care, to travel .on the new
highway and that his failure to do so constituted negligence.
Defendants further submit that the record and the law
would likewise support a verdict that defendants had been
relieved of all liability with respect to the old road by the
state's assumption of use and control of the new road. If
the new road was open no duty rested upon either the State
of Utah or the defendants to keep the old road safe for
travel.

The record in this case discloses as conclusively as one
could ever require that the accident to the plai~tiffs on
November 27, 1955, was caused by the sole negligence of
the plaintiff, P. K. Edmunds, in driving his automobile in
broad daylight into a 27 ft. cut through an abandoned
public highway which was in plain view by the exercise of
reasonable care and that defendants were guilty of no
negligence in any way causing or contributing to said
accident.
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This re.cord also shows that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing
to see this cut and avoid running into it and that all the
circumstances surrounding the accident put him on notice
that the abandoned highway had been withdrawn from
travel. Consequently defendants were entitled to directed
verdicts as to all plaintiffs and especially so with respect to
plaintiff P. K. Edmunds.
The verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs, Ella M. Edmunds and CHARLOTTE, FRANKLIN, JOHN and
ANN EDMUNDS were grossly excessive for the amount
of injury sustained by them, assuming that said plaintiffs
were entitled to recover at all.
Finally, the trial court's error in instructing and in
refusing to give instructions requested by defendants prevented them from obtaining a fair trial.

It is submitted that the judgments of the trial court
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER and
ALBERT R. BOWEN
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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